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Abstract 
This study sets out to examine if Machiavellian, realpolitik, style repression of unrest by 
autocratic regimes is still a viable tactic. To accomplish this, the Arab Spring revolutions in 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria will be used as a case study. As the revolts were for similar 
economic and political reasons in a similar population, they present excellent case studies. The 
Prince itself will be used to develop a “Machiavellian regime,” encompassing a summary of 
Machiavelli’s prescriptions for rulers. This is done to avoid propagating clichéd or incorrect 
generalizations of Machiavelli’s work. The result of the study was not kind to dictators, as could 
be imagined. Globalized media has struck a blow to their stability in two ways: first by providing 
malcontents a way to interact with otherwise pacified citizens, and second by publicizing news 
of brutality and crackdowns, thus making hatred for the ruler. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Whether influenced by the writings in The Prince or not, history has seen Machiavelli’s 
proposed techniques of information manipulation and strategic oppression of the commons 
replicated by many dictators. While such methods for repression have undoubtedly worked 
through the Middle Ages, Enlightenment, and Cold War eras, the Contemporary era brings 
potentially new aspects to political power calculations: grass roots nationalism and technological 
globalization. These two new phenomena can challenge the traditional political power structure 
within a state, and when combined can have significant ramifications for the stability of a 
regime.  
My study examines if and how those two phenomena have impacted the Machiavellian 
style of realpolitik governance. To do so, I have taken the Arab Spring revolutions as a case 
study for the application of Machiavelli’s ideas to current political crises. As the Arab Spring 
began as a relatively homogenous movement in demographics and ideals, across multiple Arab 
countries with similar political and economic systems, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria can 
all act as an effective case studies for Machiavelli’s teachings. Because the government structure 
is similar to the hereditary monarchy of Machiavelli’s day, and most domestic discrepancies are 
controlled for, an opportunity emerges to focus in on the decisions of the “prince” in command 
and how they affected the national landscape. I did not set a hard deadline on when decisions 
made by an administration before the Arab Spring would be included or disregarded. 
After isolating these decisions, I compared them with the prescriptions of Machiavelli for 
the pacification of a province and preservation of a throne. As Machiavelli also took significant 
care in explaining the importance of how a prince rose to power, the desirable qualities of 
princely leadership, and the maintenance of a domain, I will also analyze those factors in my 
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dissertation. This will be accomplished through the study of academic texts, media reports, 
speeches, and documents made by or regarding the leaders and nations chosen. With domestic 
differences controlled and traditional dictatorships established, only Machiavellian principles, 
modern technology, and the influence of fortuna remain as stimuli. 
The results of my research yielded several, perhaps expectable, results. First, the brutality 
with which a regime tried to quell the popular Arab Spring revolt had little bearing on its actual 
success in pacifying its citizenry. The country with the most success in preserving its regime, 
Morocco, used little force to advance its positions, instead relying on svelte assurances of grand 
democratization at a nebulous point in the future. In contrast, two of the most brutally repressive 
states, Egypt and Syria, continue to fight the civil war that was started as a result of their 
oppression. Both regimes, Mubarak and Assad, have lost their former state, as the likelihood of 
Syria regaining any semblance of the unity it one had under Bashar’s father seems remote. In this 
respect, Machiavelli’s pronouncements were somewhat correct. Being feared seemed sufficient 
to dissuade revolt until economic and nationalistic pressures incited it, while being loved was far 
more beneficial during the revolts as fear quickly turned into hate.  
Finally, Machiavelli’s prescriptions for how a ruler should behave and conduct himself to 
gain renown were perhaps applicable to the reaction protestors had to a prince’s actions. 
Morocco’s King, Mohammed VI, had his state media portray him as both a successful, 
benevolent prince, as well as a religious icon. When he spoke his people listened, and protestors 
were more or less satisfied with his conciliatory offer. Contrast this to Bashar Al-Assad, who had 
media support regarding his image but sullied it though his past conduct in crushing reform and 
protests. The people reacted without much respect for his offers of reform, instead choosing to 
expand their protests.  While this could have been a result of the immense pressure for 
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democratic reform emanating from within the state, Morocco’s already liberalized monarchic 
governance system,  it seems that the reputation of “princes” were important to how their people 
responded to them. 
As for the first question posited by my study, whether Machiavelli’s methods and 
prescriptions for dealing with repression still hold true today, the answer is decidedly muddy. I 
find it hard to fathom that Machiavelli would say that brutality and repression is the answer in 
every case, much as he said himself that the “prince” of Syracuse was to be derided for his 
ignoble actions, despite them being decisive and ruthless. Like many things in life and political 
theory, it may just come down to one’s interpretation of the work in question. If one reads the 
Prince very literally, as a book which lauds decisive, brutal, morally grey actions, then the Arab 
Spring case study performed clearly shows that they do not bring about the expected results. In 
that case, Machiavelli’s theories may have reached the extent of their usefulness. However if one 
reads into Machiavelli’s promotion of virtu, honorable leaders, and the idea that adoration of the 
masses, although fickle, holds great power, then Machiavelli’s theories remain more intact.  
Whereas the greater question was a muddy answer, addressing whether technology has 
impacted traditional Machiavellian actions produces a more direct answer. Anytime a regime in 
the Arab Spring tried to exercise brutality or repression to the extent necessary to accomplish a 
Machiavellian revolt-crushing, i.e. executing all opposition heads and their families, technology 
was there to blast the word out into the global domain. Twitter was a famous hero of the 
Egyptian revolutions as it helped protestors organize against police actions, but it also facilitated 
the Arab Spring movement in the first place. Satellite and cable news helped capture the 
attention of audiences around the globe to the plight of protestors, especially when governments 
were attempting to quell the demonstrations. It seems that for the classical “ends justify the 
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means” translation of the Prince, social networks, the 24 hour news cycle, and internet blogging 
may have spelled the end for centuries-old methods of ensuring regime continuity.  
This project holds several degrees of significance, depending on one’s discipline and 
interest in the project. First, it offers a relatively congruent environment in which the 
effectiveness of Machiavellian policies can be observed.  This is important for teachers of history 
and political science who devote time from their courses to Machiavelli, as it could influence 
their presentation of Machiavellian ideas as viable choices in the current geopolitical climate. 
Similarly, this holds meaning for supporters of “realist” international relations or of realpolitik, 
as it represents how their theories might play out if followed in a modern anarchic political 
environment.  
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“For men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this 
hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are 
deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad 
to worse.”  
–Niccolo Machiavelli, Il Principe (The Prince) 
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I 
Introduction 
 If asked to identify the most influential work of international relations or political theory, 
one might be hard pressed to find a more common answer than Niccolo Machiavelli’s The 
Prince. Praised and reviled, honored and disparaged, Machiavelli’s magnum opus has been 
dissected and interpreted countless times since it was first written. Within its pages, one scholar 
might find allusions to the power of ruthlessness and oppression, while another, an ode to virtu 
and honorable rule. Regardless of such ethical and philosophical interpretations, Machiavelli 
makes very clear political prescriptions to princes and conquerors alike. He offers advice on a 
variety of topics, a great deal of which involves the suppression of revolts and management of 
public opinion as a leader.  
Whether influenced by the writings in The Prince or not, history has seen Machiavelli’s 
proposed techniques of information manipulation and strategic oppression of the commons 
replicated by many dictators. While such methods for repression have undoubtedly worked 
through the Middle Ages, Enlightenment, and Early Modern era, the Contemporary era brings 
potentially new aspects to political power calculations: grass-roots nationalism and technological 
globalization. These two new phenomena can challenge the traditional political power structure 
within a state, and when combined can have significant ramifications for the stability of a 
regime.  
With that in mind, arguably the most consequential international event of the past decade 
took place during the spring of 2011. The whole event began as the result of a Tunisian man’s 
self-immolation in protest of government corruption. News of the e action spurred solidarity 
among others in the community, and soon the Tunisian uprising was well on its way to success. 
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After witnessing that protests were a viable tactic towards democratic change, other movements 
sprang up throughout the Arab world, as long repressed populations rose up against their 
dictators. Some populations came out into the street to angrily protest the existing regime, while 
others wished for a more Islamist state; but many protestors began the Arab Spring with a fervor 
for democratic principles. In many places these good intentions have been replaced by extremism 
and unremitting civil war, while a lucky few states managed to emerge from the experience with 
some sort of progress towards democratic principles. Driving these results were the actions of 
dictators, both during the protests and before any trouble had become evident. 
 Perhaps the reason why the Arab Spring was so successful and so well covered in the 
West, was the extent to which the uprisings relied on internet communications. Organizing 
protestor movements and meetings, receiving real-time intelligence on police movements, and 
broadcasting atrocities to the global community was made possible with a smartphone and proxy 
software. Without such means of dialogue, it is hard to fathom the Arab Spring spreading so far, 
or raising so much public sentiment in support of its goals, both in the west and in the countries 
themselves.  
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria,: all had different style regimes at the beginning of the 
Arab Spring, and as such, all had differing outcomes. Assuming that the domestic culture within 
each state is more or less alike, these discrepancies can be attributed to the decisions of the 
prince and to “fortuna” herself. Additionally, all of these regimes would satisfy the definition of 
a principality as described by Machiavelli, despite Morocco being the only true hereditary 
principality. The “prince” in each of these states refers to the dictator acting as the executive of 
the state. Machiavelli saw power shared by other figures, military, advisors, etc., as power 
forfeited by an inept or controlled prince. While these other, more modern style dictatorships 
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have their own quirks of power management, many of the issues they face are similar to more 
traditional kingdoms. That being said, the designation of “prince” may also suit dictators, as 
placating the state military commanders, wooing or subjugating the aristocracy, and ensuring the 
domination of the masses were just as important in Contemporary Syria as they were in 16th 
century Milan or 1st century Rome.     
It is these regimes which I will examine in this paper. As the Arab Spring began as a 
relatively homogenous movement in demographics and ideals, across multiple Arab countries 
with similar political and economic systems, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria can act as 
effective case studies for Machiavelli’s teachings. Because the government structure is similar to 
the hereditary monarchy of Machiavelli’s day, and most domestic discrepancies are controlled 
for, an opportunity to focus in on the decisions of the “prince” in command and how they 
affected the national landscape emerges. After isolating these decisions, I will compare them 
with the prescriptions of Machiavelli for the pacification of a province and preservation of a 
throne. As Machiavelli also took significant care in explaining the importance of how a prince 
arose to power, the desirable qualities of princely leadership, and the maintenance of a domain, I 
will also to analyze those factors in my dissertation. This will be accomplished through the study 
of academic texts, media reports, speeches, and documents made by or regarding the leaders and 
nations chosen.  
With domestic differences controlled and traditional dictatorships established, only 
Machiavellian principles and modern technology remain as influences over the fate of nations. 
While fortune always has a part to play, as Machiavelli himself said “it is better to be impetuous 
than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to 
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beat her and strike her down.”1 Repulsive sexism aside, it is clear that Machiavelli believes a 
strong person can bend fortune to suit their will, a not uncommon notion even today. But like the 
other issues previously raised, does such a bold prediction still ring true today? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. N.H. Thomson (New York: Dover Press, 1992), 68     
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II 
On Machiavelli 
In the realm of political science, few men have the ideological clout to rival that of 
Niccolo Machiavelli. Often counted among Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes as the fathers of 
political Realism and realpolitik, Machiavelli has unmistakably influenced the disciplines of 
political science, philosophy, international relations, and history itself.2 The Prince alone touches 
on all of these subjects through its ruminations on the optimal actions a ruler should take to 
secure his state, whether new conquests or previously subjugated territories. 
Machiavelli was born in 1469 to a well off family of Florentine civil servants. While his 
early life was not well recorded, it is known that he went to the University of Florence and 
received “an excellent humanist education.”3 During that interlude the Medici’s had been 
expelled from Florence, leaving a republican government in power. As a result, Machiavelli was 
eventually appointed “Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence,” after which information 
about Machiavelli’s actions becomes significantly more plentiful.4 As he gained favor with the 
administrators of Florence, and was sent on several diplomatic missions for the city of Florence, 
including to the courts of France and the Holy Roman Empire.5 His actions taken to strengthen 
the Florentine army were also recorded, which showed his disdain for the commonplace reliance 
on mercenary soldiers at that time, which was later reflected in The Prince.  
2 Pocock, J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. iiiv. 
3 Nederman, Cary. "Niccolò Machiavelli." Stanford University. September 13, 2005. Accessed 
April 3, 2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/#1. 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
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Unfortunately for Machiavelli, in 1512 the Medici family returned to take back their 
dynastic seat in Florence. Anyone who had colluded with the republican government was 
immediately under charge of treason, which lead to Machiavelli’s capture and torture within the 
following years. After several weeks he secured his release to an estate outside Florence, where 
he later sought to regain his stature within the Florentine political arena. But this feat would 
elude him, he would die in 1527 at the same estate.  
To revive his political career, and perhaps to occupy himself, Machiavelli spent much of 
his later years working on various literary works. Besides The Prince, his other seminal text was 
Discourses on Livy, which examined the history of early Rome. Discourses is perhaps the polar 
opposite of The Prince, as it is mainly concerned with discussing the best manner of establishing 
and ruling a republic. Throughout the work Machiavelli constantly references political 
machinations from his day to that of ancient Rome, specifically comparing the institutions of the 
absolutist French court to the administration of the Roman Republic.6 His conclusions were 
resoundingly republican, a fact which may seem contradictory given his most prominent work is 
an exploration into the ruling of repressive principalities. Along with Discourses on Livy, 
Machiavelli wrote several other notable political treatises including: The Art of War, which 
attempted to mesh ancient and renaissance military tactics for Princes, multiple discourses on 
finance, and backgrounds into the history of French and German political affairs. He also penned 
several plays and fictional works.  
As a result of these conflicting political messages, some philosophes, including Jean-Jacques 
Rosseau, have argued that Machiavelli’s writing in The Prince was not meant to be taken at face 
6 Ibid 
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value.7 Instead, they say that the work was equal parts satire of the Medici’s rule and political 
commentary on the inferiority of dictatorship to republican government, as “he [Machiavelli] 
could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's oppression.8 Machiavelli’s 
previous writings in Discourses on Livy may have inculcated his true beliefs on this subject, 
when not under direct duress or writing for another’s approval. Given Machiavelli’s affiliation 
with the revival of republican government in Florence and subsequent torture at the hands of the 
following prince, creating such a work in good conscience does seem difficult to fathom.  
However, if The Prince and The Art of War espouse any part of Machiavelli’s actual 
opinion on political power, imagining Machiavelli risking the ire of the Medici for satire seems 
equally remarkable. For a treatise which espouses decisive action from positions of power, and 
diplomacy and cunning when overmatched, writing such a document as satire seem a brash 
action from Machiavelli. This is perhaps made more irrational given that Machiavelli was 
subjected to torture by the Medici in the years prior to The Prince’s writing, with the risk of 
continued torture surely not completely assuaged.9 It is also common belief that Machiavelli 
wrote The Prince specifically for the Medici family as a means to ingratiate himself with their 
regime. If this was the case, recklessly snipping at the heels of power for delayed, and rather 
petty, revenge seems a decidedly un-Machiavellian action. Whatever truth the allegations over 
satire may carry, The Prince has widely been used as a tool to understand politics and 
government. If it was once a satire, it has now become theory.  
  
7 Rousseau, Jean Jacques. "Social Contract: Book III." Rousseau: Social Contract: Book III. 
Accessed May 3, 2015. http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon_03.htm#23. 
8 Ibid 
9 Nederman, "Niccolò Machiavelli."  
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III 
Il Principe 
 The Prince was first distributed in 1513, but was not published until 1532, several years 
after Machiavelli died.10 The book itself contains 26 chapters, all pertaining to some aspect of 
rule by a prince, with some chapters roughly grouped together by general topic. While some of 
these chapters are irrelevant for the previously stated goal of this paper, many have meaning 
which is relevant and useful for building a “Machiavellian regime.” For some reason, it seems 
that much of the common knowledge regarding The Prince has been comprised of commonly 
repeated themes of brutality and cruelty. To avoid blindly accepting these perhaps clichéd 
values, a “Machiavellian regime” will be created from The Prince itself. While combing through 
the chapters of The Prince, values, policies, decision-making strategies, and general ideas that 
Machiavelli endorses will be seized and expanded upon. After which, a hopefully more 
representative depiction of Machiavelli’s ideal regime, prince, and policy schema in a 
Contemporary setting will emerge to be used in later stages of this paper.    
i 
Types of Principalities 
To accomplish the building of such a “Machiavellian regime,” it should be noted that the 
Prince addresses several different types of princes and principalities in each of its chapters all of 
which hold meaning for the development of our Machiavellian regime theory, excepting the 
theocratic principality. The two types of principalities primarily discussed are hereditary and 
mixed principalities, the former being controlled by the same family for generations, and the 
later recently conquered.  
10 Nederman, "Niccolò Machiavelli”. 
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Hereditary principalities are first addressed in the second chapter. Machiavelli expects 
that hereditary princes will have significantly less difficulty in controlling their population than 
republics or religious principalities. He believes that “it is sufficient only not to transgress the 
customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise.”11 Given that 
these rather common requirements of a prince are met, Machiavelli sees it unlikely that power 
will be wrested from the prince in question unless “deprived of it by some extraordinary and 
excessive force.”12 He bases this on the assumption that hereditary princes have the enviable 
position of ancestral tolerance of his rule, stability and support during his transition to power, 
and forgiveness for any but the most egregious sins. If some force was to usurp the prince’s 
lands, Machiavelli expects for the hereditary prince to return soon after any significant 
misfortune befalls the usurper. In this context, hereditary monarchies can be expanded to 
encompass many dictatorships common to the Middle East during the pre-Arab Spring period.  
The clearest example of a hereditary monarchy in the Middle East-North Africa region is 
the Alawi family in Morocco, who have been well established and enjoy a significant amount of 
natural goodwill from their subjects. In Syria, the regime under Bashar Al Assad arguably also 
falls under the proposed expansion of Machiavelli’s hereditary definition, as the Al Assad regime 
had seen a generation in power over Syria by the time of the Arab Spring.13  Egypt also fulfills 
the requirements for a hereditary princedom. Although Hosni Mubarak came into power as the 
successor to Anwar Sadat, he had previously identified his son, Gamal Mubarak, as the chosen 
successor to his “presidency”.  
11 Machiavelli, The Prince. 2 
12 Ibid 
13 "Syria Profile - Timeline - BBC News." BBC News. March 24, 2015. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995. 
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The third chapter deals with mixed principalities, which had been conquered and had 
their government’s reformed into new regimes. Machiavelli sees these types of principalities as 
significantly more difficult to control than the more traditional hereditary state, simply due to the 
realities of conquest and reforming government. He believes that men “men change their rulers 
willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him 
who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have 
gone from bad to worse.”14  
After such a revolt, the new prince must create some form of soldiery to secure his new 
territory, as well as instituting “infinite other hardships” to establish a functioning government. 
Machiavelli imagines these concepts as creating a type of conundrum for any incoming prince. 
While his enemies from his conquest or rise to power will remain, openly or subversively, those 
whom the prince allied himself with to secure power will inevitably be dissatisfied with the 
immediate outcome of the regime change. Yet Machiavelli believes the prince will be unwilling 
or incapable of taking harsh actions against his former allies, as some debt or bond remains from 
their past cooperation.15 In this case, Tunisia would represent a mixed principality, as President 
Ben Ali took power through an Italian SISMI coup and never intimated plans to transfer power 
to his son.16 Because of his ascension to power, it’s possible that he owed a debt to the Italians 
for installing him as leader. And while his transition into power was rather smooth, likely as a 
result of his previous history of government service, if he was simply a private citizen installed 
by a western nation, rebellion against his rule could have been realized.         
14 Machiavelli, The Prince. 2 
15 Machiavelli, The Prince. 8 
16 Chianura, Carlo, trans. Google Translate. "La Repubblica/fatti: 'L'Italia Dietro Il Golpe in 
Tunisia'" La Repubblica/fatti: 'L'Italia Dietro Il Golpe in Tunisia' October 10, 1999. Accessed 
May 4, 2015. http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/afri/tuni/tuni.html. 
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ii 
Methods of Ascension 
After discussing hereditary and mixed principalities, Machiavelli pivots to discussing 
manners of ascension for princes who came to power besides hereditary providence. These 
methods are discussed in chapters six through nine.  
Chapter six primarily deals with Principalities acquired through a Prince’s own merit. 
This could entail those who rose from a position as a private citizen at the head of a popular 
movement or those who were successful but needed a small push from fortuna to propel their 
leadership forward; either way is valid as long as the Prince’s abilities played the key role in his 
success. Machiavelli sees such able rulers as innately more secure than the mixed rulers 
discussed in chapter three, reasoning that if their ability saw them raised to power, then the same 
ability would be a key factor in their holding onto that power. However, he does see one key 
downside to this manner of ascension to power: the fact that the Prince must create a new 
government and in the process reform the laws which brought about his overthrow of the 
previous regime. Because human nature is fickle, “he who innovates will have for his enemies all 
those who are well off under the existing order of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those 
who might be better off under the new.”17 The cure for such lackluster support? Machiavelli says 
coercion under the threat of armed force.  
Chapter seven continues to deal with manners of ascension to power, focusing on princes 
who, through no skill of their own, ascend to power by fortune or the arms of another. 
Machiavelli believes these Princes enjoy the smoothest transition to power, with their troubles 
dealt with by those more powerful and skilled than they are. Instead, they are likely to face 
17 Machiavelli, The Prince. 12 
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significant problems during their rule itself. Machiavelli sees them as lacking the skills of a ruler, 
being private citizens raised up without: the skills associated with princes in chapter six a 
steadfast loyalty from their soldiers, whose wage is being paid by another master. Thus, 
Machiavelli believes that if such a Prince does not quickly find affinity for ruling, he faces 
turmoil as soon as it faces his reign.  
Ascension to power through wickedness and deceit are discussed in chapter eight, and 
what Machiavelli truly means though this passage is arguable. He offers most of his ideas in this 
chapter through examples, namely Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliveretto of Fermo, who became 
Pope Alexander VI. Both men featured by Machiavelli used cruelty and deceit to manufacture 
their power, particularly Agathocles, who murdered of all of ancient Syracuse’s senatorial class 
with the help of the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, Machiavelli says that men who come to power 
through such skullduggery can be very secure in their power, despite not having outright fortune 
or ability on their side. This is accomplished through a mix of brutality and cruelty implemented 
at the time of taking power, and maintained throughout the regime. While a discussion on 
chapter eight’s perspective on the use of cruelty and decisive action is warranted, that will be 
saved for the section discussing Machiavellian policy more specifically.  
Chapter nine discusses civil principalities, specifically princes who are raised as a result 
of some popular support. However, this does not immediately connote a republic, as the prince in 
question could still be as much a dictator as before. Machiavelli says that such a prince will run 
into serious issues defining the base of his support, as if he was raised up by the people then the 
aristocracy will be set against him, whereas if he is raised up the aristocracy the people will find 
reason to hate him.   
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Chapters six through nine offer some interesting conclusions regarding what Machiavelli 
might have recommended the Arab Spring regimes do when faced with popular uprising. While 
chapter six perhaps deals more directly with those regimes which rose to power after the Arab 
Spring, its lessons regarding innovation and the necessity of arms could be useful when 
examining the prior policies of many states. When combined with the lessons from chapter nine, 
there is some foreshadowing of the problems awaiting military regimes, as in Egypt, where 
Hosni Mubarak was a man raised from the officer class based on ability.  
iii 
Soldiery 
Machiavelli touches on how to secure a recently acquired territory in chapter three, 
focusing on the development of cultural “colonies” in the acquired territory.18 While it appears 
that much of his theory relies on the assumption that it would be too costly to maintain a 
powerful military force in a territory, which is a moot point given that this study focuses on 
contiguous states which have not significantly expanded their borders in the modern era, his 
theories still hold some merit. He sees large garrisons of soldiers as inefficient and costly 
options, which irritate the constantly deployed and rotating soldiers, as well as the citizenry.19 
Machiavelli also suggests consideration of the “balance of power” between one’s state and its 
neighbors, so that no nearby foreign power is invited easily able to assert influence in the new 
territory. This may be especially poignant in the Middle East given the prominence of tribal 
loyalties across shifting borders and regimes.  
18 Machiavelli, The Prince. 4-5 
19 Ibid. 
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Chapter ten sees Machiavelli discuss one way in which the strength of a state should be 
measured: its defense. Coming from a renaissance mindset, in this chapter Machiavelli focuses 
on defending one’s princedom from siege at the hands of an invading foreign power. He sees two 
major parts in this defense, the physical fortifications needed to secure territory, and enough 
loyalty from the citizenry to avoid rebellion during the siege. As an example, he references the 
German states of the Holy Roman Empire, which are quite weak individually and offensively, 
but have enough fortifications and devotion from their subjects to make a protracted siege overly 
painful for the aggressor. In today’s world, this idea might be more closely associated with the 
tendency of a state towards lengthy insurgent conflicts and rebellions.  
Chapter twelve embodies Machiavelli’s hatred for mercenary soldiers. He initially says 
this because he sees mercenary forces as mercenary, men who have no qualms accepting 
payment from a prince then looting both sides after the end of a conflict. Soldiers and leaders 
who will take money during peacetime with a loose guarantee of service if war occurs. But 
Machiavelli holds that such mercenary soldiers will likely desert a prince in need before they 
actually see fighting, as the “paltry sum” which makes up their pay is unlikely to warrant 
sacrifice of their lives.20 If they do reach the battlefield, Machiavelli expects them to have low 
morale, and be a generally insubordinate and inefficient fighting force. And if they do fight and 
emerge critical to the strength of the prince’s army, they are likely to overthrow the prince and 
take it for themselves. Machiavelli uses many examples to detail his disdain for mercenaries, 
ranging from the highly mercenary based armies in renaissance Florence and Venice to the Punic 
Wars.  
20 Machiavelli, The Prince. 34 
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Machiavelli’s disdain for non-domestic military forces continues in chapter thirteen, 
where Machiavelli discusses the use of auxiliary forces. In this context, auxiliary is less used in 
terms of the late Roman military, who eventually made up much of their standing force from 
tribal levies, but instead is taken to describe the forces of allies called into the country to aid the 
prince there. Machiavelli sees these allied forces in a similar light to their mercenary 
counterparts, worthless if the prince loses, but powerful enough to assert outside influence over 
the country if victorious. Again, he gives historic examples of auxiliary forces commanding the 
prince they once were sworn to aid, and espouses the benefits of a domestic force.         
Finally, Machiavelli deals with a prince’s mental capacity for warfare in chapter fourteen. 
But he does not limit such training to simply studying histories and strategy, instead promoting a 
more holistic method for accommodating oneself with the military establishment. Machiavelli 
says that the prince must remain active with his soldiers, in doing so keeping himself fit and his 
soldiers recognizant of his commanding presence. At the same time, having the prince 
accompany his men on drills and patrols will inform him of his land, especially in terms of the 
best defensive locations, traps, and thoroughfares in times of war. In this exploration the prince 
also has an opportunity to get to know his subjects and build some manner of rapport with them. 
Machiavelli takes care to note that these measures should all be taken in times of peace as well as 
war, so that the prince remains a competent strategist and the state appears cohesive from abroad.  
While military generalship and methods of staffing one’s army may be less dependent on the 
sovereign today than in renaissance Italy, Machiavelli’s basic ideas still shine through. A prince 
should remain knowledgeable in the exercise of military maneuvers, and have an in-depth 
understanding of his own territory and means of defending it. The appearance of a strong defense 
and united populace is almost more important than the actual presence of one. The prince should 
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also be cognizant of dangers from mercenary and auxiliary soldiers to his regime, especially in 
the religiously-driven foreign fighter environment of the modern Middle East. While Machiavelli 
may have approved of mercenary fighters in an hour of great need, there is no doubt that he 
prefers the use of domestic fighters.  
iv 
A Prince’s Personality 
Chapter fifteen marks the beginning of Machiavelli’s discussion of personality and 
princely conduct, and with it comes the viewpoints which have made The Prince so enduring yet 
continually derided. Though the chapter itself is short, it introduces the notion that the Prince 
should be both made up of goodness and vice, with the ability to act in either manner as he sees 
fit. It should also be noted that this chapter verges on advocating for some form of public 
relations, as Machiavelli notes that it is important for a prince to appear good to his subjects and 
confidents, despite what truly may be in his nature.  
Chapter sixteen focuses on two important economic qualities a prince should consider: 
liberality and miserliness. These two notions are ever at odds with one another, locked in an 
everlasting struggle between the prince’s reputation and economic policy. If a prince is liberal 
with his spending and lavishes gifts on his friends, he is likely to be popular and well renowned, 
but hated by those he taxes as a result. The miserly prince is less well regarded, but can make up 
for this image by setting reasonable tax policy for his subjects. Machiavelli firmly believes in the 
later, stating that the frugal prince is the one with the most good will and longevity of rule. In 
essence, “it is wiser to put up with the name of being miserly, which breeds ignominy, but 
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without hate, than to be obliged, from the desire to be reckoned liberal, to incur the reproach of 
rapacity, which breeds hate as well as ignominy.”21   
Chapter seventeen is perhaps the landmark chapter of The Prince, in which Machiavelli 
discusses whether it is better to be loved or feared, and in doing so, catapulted the book into 
history. Machiavelli’s argument in this chapter rests on several points. First, love is an emotion 
which is totally dependent on ones subjects, unable to be directly controlled by a sovereign but 
easily swayed by the notion of personal gain. Fear, on the other hand, is totally dependent on the 
actions of the sovereign. Second, fear and love can hardly co-exist with one another. Third, 
cruelty and fear can sometimes do more good for a country than kindness could. Revolutions, 
famine, plagues, all of these disasters could catastrophically cripple a state and cause immense 
suffering to its population. While the kindly king might worry about taking harsh actions to 
quarantine the damage, a pragmatic prince will accept the shawl of cruelty in order to protect his 
state from the maximum amount of harm. The same is true when marshalling an army, 
compassion should be forgotten to instill discipline. Finally, hatred must be avoided at all costs. 
Machiavelli could not overstate this point, it seems, as he hammered it home with many 
examples. He said that above all, a prince could avoid hatred if he did two things: “not meddle 
with the property or with the women of his citizens and subjects.”22 He says that torture and 
executions are acceptable when there is reasonable cause or justification, but taking a man’s 
patrimony from him is much more grievous than taking his father’s head.   
Chapter eighteen strikes an interesting balance, mixing how princes should keep their 
faith through tough times with a rudimentary discussion of public relations management. He 
21 Machiavelli, The Prince. 42 
22 Machiavelli, The Prince. 44 
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begins the chapter by discussing the need for duplicity in princely dealings. While a prince 
should be willing to negotiate with their enemies like civilized men, the cunning “beast” should 
always be ready to solve the situation with guile. Each situation facing a regime could call for a 
different style of policy, bold or cunning, the lion or the fox. But Machiavelli believes it is 
unreliable to rely on one type of ruling style over another, assuming that human nature is 
naturally dishonest. Assuming that treachery and cunning will always have a place in statecraft, 
and is likely decide the victor, Machiavelli says that a prince must keep a “good colour” on his 
nature and say nothing which is not virtuous.23 Religion is important in this function, as being an 
espoused follower of a religion ensures subjects of a prince’s virtues even though they cannot 
witness them for themselves.  
Chapter nineteen furthers the message that Machiavelli put forward in his previous two 
chapters, but focuses on avoiding hatred rather than the efficacy of cunning action. As previously 
stated, Machiavelli believed that above all, a prince must avoid taking his citizens women and 
property. Those cases excepting, a prince must also avoid being seen as “fickle, frivolous, 
effeminate, pusillanimous, or irresolute,”24 and instead project an aura of wisdom and virtue. The 
prince who manages to project such an image of himself gains great security in his position. The 
greatest threat to a prince is conspiracy and revolution, but Machiavelli says that if a prince is 
well-respected, the initial conspirator risks greatly in involving anyone else in their plot. He puts 
it plainly, that: “on the side of the conspirator there are distrust, jealousy, and dread of 
punishment to deter him, while on the side of the prince there are the laws, the majesty of the 
throne, the protection of friends and of the government to defend him; to which if the general 
23 Machiavelli, The Prince. 46 
24Machiavelli, The Prince. 47-48  
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good will of the people is added it is hardly possible that any should be rash enough to 
conspire.”25 Machiavelli then goes into examples from Roman Emperors, suggesting that every 
prince must strike a balance between ferocity and justice to please their soldiers and citizenry 
respectively. While he says that in the past the soldiers needed to be humored, Machiavelli thinks 
that the lack of standing armies in Renaissance Italy has swung the balance in favor of the 
citizenry. That perhaps gives perspective on what factor determines who a prince should favor 
the most, the size of a states standing army.  
v 
On Policy and Government 
Chapter twenty sees Machiavelli dealing with a variety of topics, including disarmament, 
using factions to divide subjects, and the building of fortresses in their lands. The first issue he 
covers, disarmament, is not thought outright wrong or right. Instead, Machiavelli says that it 
makes sense for new princes to arm their new citizenry. While that may seem counterintuitive, as 
the ascension of a prince to a throne is likely to create some enemies of his reign, the subjects 
directly armed by the prince will begin to trust him, while their counterparts see him as trusting 
their citizenry as a whole. This is in comparison to disarmament, which shows weakness, fear, 
and mistrust of the citizenry by the new prince. However, disarmament of new territory 
conquered by a prince is to be lauded, simply because order will need to be enforced by those 
with unquestionable loyalty to the prince.  
Machiavelli then begins to discuss the creation of feuds within the populace as a means 
of pitting their anger against one another instead of the ruler. He sees this as an incredibly 
shortsighted policy, as it divides the prince’s resources in the case of invasion, not to mention 
25 Machiavelli, The Prince. 48-49 
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creates motivation for the weaker faction to join with an invading army. Likewise if conflict is 
created simply as a means to gain more glory for a prince, then it should be ceased. However, he 
does make some interesting conclusions regarding the usefulness of advisors who may have been 
against the prince in the past. Because those who were initially hostile to his rule “have to efface 
by their conduct the unfavorable impression he had formed of them,” the prince may gain more 
honest advice from them than from a continual lackey. This beings especially interesting 
connotations when Machiavelli discusses newly acquired territories which rebelled to another 
government. Assuming that there was no special love for the prince put in power, such territories 
inevitably had some violent dissatisfaction with the previous government, and are thus unlikely 
to be completely pleased with the following administration. In such a case, a prince may be 
better off shunning those who brought him into power and instead allying with those who sought 
to preserve the previous status quo.  
The last section of chapter twenty is devoted to the construction of fortresses within a 
princes own territory. Machiavelli approves the construction of fortresses for those princes more 
afraid of their subjects than of foreign invaders, whereas the opposite is true for those more 
afraid of foreigners than their subjects. While fortresses offer minor protection from rebellion 
and foreigners alike, they can be captured and used against the prince in future campaigns. 
Instead, Machiavelli returns to his point about hatred. If a populace hates the prince, either they 
or an opportunistic foreign power will defeat the fortress eventually. But by ensuring the 
dedication of the citizenry, the notion of a state-wide insurgency will thwart conspirators and 
invaders both.  
Chapter twenty-one continues Machiavelli’s lionizing of public relations management 
and shrewd diplomacy. A prince should show that he is a patron of the arts, cognizant of his 
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subject’s desires for success in life. Similarly, he should regularly hold shows and festivals 
during which he shows his “munificence” while ensuring to keep his dignity. That being said, 
“nothing makes a Prince so well thought of as to undertake great enterprises and give striking 
proofs of his capacity.”26 Thus Machiavelli promotes the use of manufactured causus belli as a 
means to cement a prince’s power. He then goes on to deal with the situation of feuding 
neighbors. Regardless of how equally matched the sides are, the prince should always align 
himself with one of the sides in question. Not only does it provide him a chance to appear 
glorious and honorable, but it also wins him only a steadfast ally at worst, while an alliance and 
spoils of war come with victory. Machiavelli does caution a prince from allying with a power 
significantly stronger than his own, or as a conglomerate weaker than their opponent, as the 
possibility of domination by the strongest state is never truly alleviated. Similarly, the prince 
should avoid upsetting the balance of power too much in his choice of alliances, as it could end 
up in his realm becoming the next in a series of conquests.   
Chapter twenty two focuses in on ministerial choices available to a prince, and how they 
represent his personality. In fact, Machiavelli believes that “the readiest conjecture we can form 
of the character and sagacity of a prince is from seeing what sort of men he has about him.”27 If a 
prince can recognize the merit and fidelity of a good advisor, then he is likely a wise man, while 
the opposite connotation is also true. While this view certainly could have been influenced by 
Machiavelli’s profession, it seems to have some merit. A prince or ruler who is wise enough to 
understand that an honest opinion from an advisor is worthwhile will likely perform his job 
better because of the input. While a prince who listens to appeasers or advisors who put their 
26 Machiavelli, The Prince. 59 
27 Machiavelli, The Prince. 62 
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personal interests ahead of their liege is likely to be subject to poor advice at best, and treachery 
at worst. To cultivate the devotion and honesty of ministers, Machiavelli says that they must be 
treated well, and, when asked, should be allowed to speak their opinions on a subject without 
fear of retaliation.  
As an addendum to this premise, Machiavelli says in chapter twenty-three that flatterers 
should be avoided to the furthest extent they are possible to avoid. To do this, Machiavelli sees 
only one prudent course of action, for the prince to show that he doesn’t punish advisors for 
speaking truthfully to him. While he is within his rights to deny people speaking advice when it 
is not asked, a wise prince should understand that, if asked for, he should contemplate a spoken 
truth without clear rage or discomfort. But Machiavelli makes it clear, the prudence of a wise 
prince is never solely due to his advisors, instead a prudent prince is wise because he listens to 
counsel.  
These chapters are perhaps the most important in all of The Prince, as they make up the core of 
Machiavelli’s non-philosophical ideas. While many of them may seem like common sense, 
princes both in the past and present have failed to effectively avoid flattering advisors, an 
overreliance on fortifications, and insufficient propaganda, and have paid the price for their 
failings. As such, all of these prescriptions are incredibly important to understand in developing 
the “Machiavellian regime”, even if some, such as the construction of defenses to deter invading 
armies, have little consequence on the Arab Spring revolutions.  
vi 
Ruthlessness versus Virtu 
Arguably, the commonly held belief about Machiavelli is that he espouses brutality over 
humanity, in that a prince should think of nothing other than his wellbeing and power when 
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making decisions. This is represented in the word which takes his name “Machiavellian,” which 
has come to describe an immoral, underhanded, cunning, or treacherous action. A similar fate 
has befallen his public persona, wherein Machiavelli has come to represent the most 
reproachable aspects of statecraft. But a more nuanced reading of his works may open up new 
understandings of his ideas. As previously mentioned, The Prince was not Machiavelli’s only 
work, simply the one with the greatest longevity. Discourses on Livy and The Art of War are 
equally if not more detailed works, but are often forgotten in favor of the more striking Prince.  
That being said, even within the Prince there can be some variation in what Machiavelli is taken 
to mean. While it is undeniable that he endorses brutality as a means to prevent greater 
bloodshed, a regime culture of fear rather than mercy, and the use of princely diplomacy and 
nobility as a shield for his more underhanded politics, Machiavelli also has a lot to say regarding 
virtu. Virtu, is a difficult concept to define. Some scholars refer to it as a sort of human energy 
counterbalancing the influence of fortune.28 Actions can be considered virtu regardless of their 
morality of the honor behind them, it is simply a word to recognize the spirit of doing something 
to empower oneself.  
Virtu can also be taken to represent honor, as is primarily discussed in chapter eight, 
where he discusses princes who have seized their throne through some form of treachery. Instead 
of being outright supportive of such politics, Machiavelli criticizes the actions and policies of the 
examples in that chapter. He says: “to slaughter fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of 
honor, pity, and religion, cannot be counted as merits, for these are means which may lead to 
28 Yadav, Yogendra, and Suhas Palshikar. "Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress' 
Ambiguous Victory in 2009." Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 39 (2009): 33. Accessed 
May 3, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663593?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents. 
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power but which confer no glory.”29 He goes on to say that these actions alone do not make a 
man a bad captain or leader, but bar him from inclusion with the “greatest men.” If the traditional 
view of Machiavelli is to be taken to heart, this statement makes no sense. Agathocles of 
Syracuse, the subject of the example, was a cunning man who managed to seat himself on a 
throne through shifting alliances and mass-murder. He was ruthless, cold, and calculating, all 
attributes which a pragmatic view of Machiavelli would wholeheartedly endorse. Yet 
Machiavelli does the opposite, acknowledging his skill but denying him glory or approval 
because of his lack of honor. This idea emerges in other sections, although not as plainly. A 
prince should strive to be feared, but should remain just and merciful whenever possible. He 
should act with cunning and swiftness to smash revolts against his reign, but also interact with 
his people so that they feel some devotion to him. He should become well versed in projecting 
diplomatic nobility as a disguise for darker intentions, but should also treat his advisors with 
respect and appreciation. These ideas could arguably be pragmatism as well, or could be some 
remaining notions of chivalry which had yet to be forsaken, but Machiavelli’s idolization of 
Alexander the Great and other ancient rulers as pinnacles of virtu and statecraft could also mean 
that Machiavelli believes there is a necessary place for honor in a regime.     
As mentioned previously, it is hard to achieve an adroit reading of Machiavelli’s 
philosophy in The Prince. Questions of whether he wrote the work as satire, contradictions in 
how fortuna and virtu seem to be interrelated, artistic license in translations, and Machiavelli’s 
clearly limited political position when writing all have an influence on how the work is to be 
understood. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that Machiavelli may not have been quite as 
“Machiavellian” as we consider he was today.  
29 Machiavelli, The Prince. 21  
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vii 
The Machiavellian Regime 
Taking into account all of the chapters previously mentioned, a rough conglomeration of 
ideas should start to appear. By applying these concepts to the scenarios of the Arab Spring, a 
picture of if they were followed and how well they succeeded should become clear. Several 
distinctions can be made to inform the qualities of the regime. Which distinctions apply to which 
regime will have to be decided individually, regime by regime, as they hold different drawbacks 
and advantages based on one’s membership.   
The first distinction can be taken as the divide between regimes which were hereditary 
versus mixed. Hereditary princes should have the easiest time controlling their population, 
assuming they take care not to offend any traditions in the exercise of their regime. It should also 
be possible for hereditary regimes to maintain power through misfortune, as familiarity with their 
rule should ensure greater dedication despite what may occur. Such an attribute should be 
especially valuable to regimes during the Arab Spring. But as mentioned before, Morocco, Syria, 
and Egypt all had some form of hereditary monarchy at the beginning of the Arab Spring, yet 
have seen wildly different events as a result of their actions.   
Mixed principalities reference regimes which were created from conquest, rather than 
dynastically formed. These regimes have less freedom of action, lacking the generational 
familiarity the hereditary regime enjoys, as well as more reason to anger their people during the 
process of setting up a government. Machiavelli also believes a prince in a mixed principality 
will have a difficult time controlling his former allies. Thus the Tunisian regime will naturally 
have a significantly more difficult task in placating their populace than those in a hereditary 
regimes.  
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The second distinction is specifically for mixed principalities, and revolves around the 
method used by the prince to ascend to power. If a prince ascended through his own merit, i.e. 
using his talent to empower himself, then Machiavelli sees him as likely to succeed by way of 
the same talent and dedication. The only major downside comes from the fact that he must begin 
a new government, and likely initiate some reform as to satisfy those who deposed his 
predecessor. Princes who come to power through the strength of others are expected to be less 
skilled, lacking loyalty from their soldiers and ruling elite. They must quickly learn to be a prince 
or risk being easily deposed or controlled. Civil principalities, princes raised up by the people, 
are also dangerous, as the classes who didn’t take part in raising him to power will likely be set 
against him for his rule. These distinctions in how a prince must act based on the nature of his 
ascension to power perhaps lack outright direction, but do present a roadmap of potential dangers 
to regimes of that ilk.  
Regardless of ascension or type of regime, the ideal sovereign personality Machiavelli 
describes through The Prince remains largely the same, built around a duplicitous nature. On one 
hand, the ideal prince should act diplomatically, ensuring to project his honor and morality to all 
those under him. The idea of virtu should not be foreign to a prince, and he should be willing to 
take his own fortune into his hands. He should also strive to be recognized as a just lord, 
avoiding arbitrary decisions and bad counsel whenever possible. Similarly, he should be 
educated, not only in matters of military importance, but also in matters of history and 
topography. He should also be willing to listen to truths from his advisors, never jumping to 
anger if he is displeased by their comments. Yet, he should be ruthlessly pragmatic about his 
regime. While he is negotiating and presenting himself as honorable, a prince should always be 
working to find a solution through cunning, and always guarding against the treachery of other 
29 
 
men. The prince should also be willing to commit cruel or inhumane actions to quell revolts and 
ensure peace, his justification for doing so is that more people would die if war or revolution is 
allowed to occur. A prince should understand that fear should be preferred to love, as the love of 
subjects is fickle. Above all, a prince should understand that hatred of the people must be 
avoided at all costs, and that sacrificing an ally or friend is well worth the stability of a placated 
populace.  
Machiavelli’s suggested policy for princes follows in a similar manner. Princes should be 
frugal, as excessive liberality with public funds invites outrage over higher taxes. Internal 
political parties, fortresses, and overreliance on individual advisors is to be avoided as they can 
all be turned against the prince by an outside power. The prince should have a working 
knowledge of the military and his territory, and should avoid the employ of mercenary and allied 
forces if at all possible. The appearance of a strong state military is important to dissuade outside 
forces from invading, and it allows for the prince to influence the balance of power among his 
neighbors. The use of harsh tactics to maintain order in a state is acceptable, as long as the 
actions are only sustained for as long as necessary. The use of public relations and propaganda is 
wise, as it will ensure the people of the prince’s morality and enable him to act in manner which 
might otherwise be unacceptable. Those who might plot against the prince will be hard pressed 
to succeed if the population does not hate him and is convinced of his righteousness.  
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IV 
Morocco 
To begin analyzing how regimes dealt with the Arab Spring Revolutions, perhaps the best 
place to start is with the only regime which survived the revolution, the Moroccan Monarchy. 
The Al-Alouwi Monarchy is a perfect example of one of Machiavelli’s hereditary principalities, 
with a continuous reign by one family stretching back until 1664, and independence from French 
occupation since 1956.30 The longest running monarch since gaining independence was Hassan 
II, who kept peace in the nation as neighboring states began to unravel, but at a high cost. Until 
his reign ended in 1999, “a truth commission set up to investigate human rights violations during 
his reign confirmed nearly 10,000 cases,” also confirming that Hassan II was not afraid to shy 
away from brutality to keep power.31 After Hassan II came Mohammed VI, the monarch in 
power during 2011. Along with this tradition of rule, there are several key differences in the 
Moroccan economy and political system which differentiated them from their North African 
neighbors.  
Firstly, the Moroccan economy was relatively stronger than other regimes in the region. 
While common North African issues with unemployment and underemployment of graduates 
remained at around nine percent, they were not nearly as crippling as in other countries.32 An 
IMF report in 2010 said that:  
“The direct impact of the global crisis on Morocco has been limited, primarily affecting 
Morocco through real channels. Exports, tourism receipts, remittances, and FDI have all 
30 "Morocco Country Profile - Overview - BBC News." BBC News. April 29, 2015. Accessed 
May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14121438. 
31 Ibid 
32 "Morocco: Selected Issues." International Monetary Fund, 2013, 19. Accessed May 2, 2015. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.pdf.  
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declined this year, due primarily to the slowdown in Europe. Nonetheless, with a strong 
starting position, reflecting in large part the range of macroeconomic and structural 
reforms introduced over the last decade, Morocco has been well-positioned to weather 
and respond to the crisis. In particular, Morocco’s financial system is sound, with little 
exposure to international markets.”33 
While tourism was identified in that report as a sector that suffered from some decline, it 
continued to be successful in a way that no other North African nation enjoyed. The Moroccan 
government had identified tourism as a means of expanding their economy through “Vision 
2010” and “Plan Azur”, which jointly called for an increase in tourism advertising and identified 
six new locations for costal development.34 Additionally, there was investment in Moroccan 
tourism and real estate by Gulf Nations, pouring even more money into the countries burgeoning 
tourism sectors.35 And as a result, Morocco’s agricultural sector decreased between 2009 and 
2010, while service and industry grew to replace their loss.36  
Morocco’s relatively strong economic position leading up to the Arab Spring revolutions 
may have softened the initial blow in comparison to less prosperous nations. Instead of 
protesting the availability of bread, protestors in Morocco were first more interested in 
democratization of government. While there was some records of protests regarding the cost of 
33 "Morocco: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation." International Monetary Fund. 5. 
December 23, 2009. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1058.pdf. 
34 Hoare, Elspeth. "Rocking the Kasbah." Arabian Business. August 28, 2008. Accessed May 4, 
2015. http://www.arabianbusiness.com/rocking-kasbah-44551.html. 
35 Smith, Sylvia. "Morocco's Culture Aids Its Economy - BBC News." BBC News. September 
11, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-14829617. 
36 "Morocco: Annual Data and Forecast." The Economist: Intelligence Unit. April 21, 2015. 
Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1673092151&Country=Morocco&topic=Economy
&subtopic=Charts and tables&subsubtopic=Annual data and forecast. 
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utilities and unemployment in the country, comparing those isolated incidents with the 
economics focused protests in Tunisia is impossible.37 Thus, the reforms necessary to quell the 
protestors may have been more focused than for other nations. However, it should be noted that 
as the effects of the Eurozone crisis became more pronounced in Morocco’s tourism-based 
economy, protesters became more interested in economic failures. This may not have manifested 
itself fully until after the King’s referendum.   
Secondly, the Moroccan political system and Monarchy prior to the Arab Spring was 
unlike any other regime in the region. Instead of an outright absolute monarchy or military junta, 
Morocco had maintained a form of absolute-constitutional monarchy since its constitution was 
ratified in the early 1960’s. In 1996, a push for reform led Hassan II to shift towards a bicameral 
parliament, expanding the supposed democratization of the state.38 This created a unique fusion 
of constitutional monarchy and theocracy. The King retained the right to “appoint the Prime 
Minister and Members of the Cabinet, as well as the powers to dissolve parliament, arrange new 
elections, and rule by decree.”39 Basic human rights were also enshrined within the Moroccan 
constitution, including equal protection under the law, political rights, freedom of expression, 
and freedom of the press, although those rights had been limited by royal decree on a case by 
case basis.40 The King remained appointed as the state’s “divine leader”, maintaining his 
37Karam, Souhail. "Riots in Moroccan City over Utility Costs." Reuters. February 19, 2011. 
Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/morocco-riots-
idUSLDE71I08K20110219. 
38 Ketterer, James P. "From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco." The Journal of 
Legislative Studies 7, no. 1, 135-50. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.cid.suny.edu/publications1/Ketterer From One Chamber to Two - The Case of 
Morocco.pdf. 
39 El-Maarouf, M.D., Mourad El Fahli, and Jerome Kuchejda. "Morocco: KAS Democracy 
Report 2009." 257-267. January 1, 2009. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
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dynastic contention that they were descended from the Prophet Muhammad.41 While the King 
still held nigh-absolute power in the state, the bicameral nature of the constitutional monarchy 
promoted some representation and a structure for social stability.42 The lower house would be 
directly elected by the citizenry of Morocco, while the upper house would be elected by 
professional organizations.43 While the legislatures had the ability to determine the budget and 
potentially impeach the government, corruption and influence by the King firmly controlled the 
institutionalization of party democracy.44 This potentially gave the King more flexibility when 
faced with the demands of pro-reform protestors, as he not only gained ministerial scapegoats for 
any actions or inactions, but it also gave him a foundation from which to develop his reform 
platform. And with such an enshrined religious pedigree, removal of the king from power would 
be a difficult proposition to many of Morocco’s faithful.  
Those two defining features established, moving to examine the qualities and actions of 
Mohammed VI, Morocco’s monarch during the Arab Spring, is the logical next step in 
contrasting his actions with those suggested by The Prince. 
To begin, it’s important to understand the distinction between Mohammed VI and his 
father, Hassan II. As previously mentioned, Hassan was notoriously prone to brutality, repressing 
revolts with disregard for international pressures. With such a history of brutality in the past, one 
might’ve expected Mohammed VI to continue on a similar trajectory, especially when 
confronted with the eruption of large scale protests during the Arab Spring. Instead he took a 
more controlled approach to governing. Mohammed VI had become known as a reformer, far 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid 
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less brutal than his father, and was generally loved by his people.45 He had developed a wide 
ranging propaganda network, allowing him to push his image as a reformer and religious figure 
out to the general public en-masse. Ritualistic military and religious traditions helped to cement 
this image of the King, especially in lower class and rural areas.46 Soon after his rule, he formed 
the Equity and Reconciliation Commission which sought to document his father’s abuses and to 
offer reparations to their victims. However, Mohammed’s regime has also been identified as 
particularly corrupt. In the famous “WikiLeaks” diplomatic cables, Mohammed was said to have 
attempted to reform the corruption present in his father’s regime, but had inadvertently presided 
over its institutionalization.47 While North Africa is no stranger to corruption, it did provide 
protestors with a source of outrage against the ruling family.  
Through these actions it’s clear that even before the protests, Mohammed VI had a clear 
base of support behind him. In the battle between being loved and feared, Mohammed was 
certainly more loved, and had unquestionably managed to avoid hatred from the majority of the 
population. He had also managed to establish control of the country after his father’s death, 
avoiding any extraordinarily powerful advisors or generals. He also understood the value of a 
public persona, spending a significant amount of time working to reinforce his image as a 
reformer and beneficent monarch through propaganda. By Machiavelli’s theory, all that was 
required of Mohammed to retain a firm grasp on his throne was the honoring of dynastic 
45 Erlanger, Steven. "Morocco King Proposes Limited Steps to Democracy." The New York 
Times, June 17, 2011. Accessed May 2, 2015. 
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traditions, a willingness to use cunning if necessary, and the continual avoidance of actions 
which could incite public hatred.   
i 
Protests 
For Mohammed VI, the Arab Spring began in earnest on February 20, 2011, when a 
Facebook-organized protest of around 10,000 citizens marched through the streets of Rabat.48 
Unlike the brutal reprisals quickly enacted by other regimes, the Moroccan police stayed 
removed until that night, when they persuaded remaining protestors to return to their homes. 
Nevertheless, several groups including the “February 20 Movement for Change,” emerged from 
the protests and quickly gathered a large online following. 49 Through Facebook and Twitter, 
protests spread to Marrakech, Casablanca, and many other Moroccan towns. But unlike in Egypt 
and Libya, protestors mainly called for a new, more democratic, constitution rather than the 
outright removal of the King.  
In response to the protests, Mohammed VI made a landmark speech on March 9. In it, he 
announced the creation of a commission to develop constitutional revisions, promising an 
unveiling in June.50 The March 9 announcement was taken with optimism by most protestors, 
but protests continued after its announcement. This period also saw an uptick in the amount of 
police repression and arrests made on the protestors, although whether that was an isolated 
48 Champion, Marc. "Morocco Joins In, Defying Predictions." Wall Street Journal. February 21, 
2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703498804576156180408970252. 
49 "Morocco Protesters Demand Political Change - BBC News." BBC News. February 20, 2011. 
Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12518116. 
50 "Moroccan Monarch Pledges Reform." Al Jazeera English. March 9, 2011. Accessed May 4, 
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incident or directive from the government is hard to determine.5152 On June 1, Mohammed 
announced his reforms for a new constitution, chief among them: the replacement of the King as 
head of government and chief policymaker by the elected Prime Minister. Other reforms were 
also included in his proposal, including: the election of the Prime Minister by the party who wins 
the most seats, parliamentary oversight of civil rights, civic and social equality for women, an 
independent judiciary, and high-governmental appointments made jointly by the Prime Minister 
and King. Yet Mohammed retained some of his previous powers, including total control over the 
military, the ability to appoint judges, and a slightly reworded, yet still significant proclamation 
of his religious importance to the nation. While the reforms were not broad enough to satisfy all 
of the protestors, the July referendum which ratified the changes to the constitution was passed 
with a turnout of 73%, with 98.5% of voters approving the changes.53  
Soon after the changes were ratified, an election was held to determine the makeup of the 
new government. A moderate Islamist party emerged victorious, nominated their own prime 
minister, and set about appointing their own government ministers. But contrary to what 
might’ve been expected after such a referendum and free elections, protests continued well into 
2012 and 2013 with turnouts similarly sized to those prior to the referendum. But these protests 
were different in that they focused more on economic issues such as unemployment, literacy, 
utility costs, and a growing agricultural crisis. The protests were also different in that they often 
51 "Moroccan Police Break up Rally, Hurt Dozens-witness." Reuters. March 14, 2011. Accessed 
May 4, 2015. 
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Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13964550. 
53 Karam, Souhail. "Moroccan King Triumphs in Reform Vote." Reuters. July 1, 2011. Accessed 
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found less fault with the king and his regime than with the ruling parliamentary party. 54 Whether 
Mohammed VI meant to accomplish such a maneuver is debatable, but even if coincidental the 
maneuver evokes direct correlation with the act described in the prince. Similarly, if such a move 
was calculated at some point by Mohammed, it would certainly not have been in his best interest 
to publicize its execution.   
There has also been some debate over whether the King’s transfer of power to the civilian 
government has actually changed anything about the Moroccan governing structure. Whereas 
some experts claim that the reforms made to the Moroccan constitution have created the 
beginnings of a strong popular democracy, there is a real argument that the King’s position in 
Morocco is even stronger than before the protests. Because of the party structure and coalition 
requirement of the Moroccan parliamentary system, infighting between powerful moderate 
Islamist groups has been weakening the monarchy’s main opponents. And as mentioned before, 
while that infighting occurred external blame for the countries lack of progress fell more on the 
shoulders of the ruling parties, instead of the King. This has given Mohammed the chance to 
expand his soft power within his nation. Instead of spending all his hours ruling from the palace, 
he has instead waded into his people’s problems as a sort of protective, advocate figure for the 
public good.55 The dysfunction of the Moroccan parliament has also given Mohammed a 
substantial amount of power not reserved to him by the constitution. With his religious standing 
54 "Power to Some Other People." The Economist. March 17, 2012. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21550294. 
55 Al-Tagi, Mohammad, trans. Pascale El-Khoury. "Despite His 'Absence,' Moroccan King 
Maintains Total Authority.” Al-Monitor. August 25, 2013. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
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and public persona, the King’s now has a formal and informal method of vetoing legislation.56 In 
a way, the King has become the nexus of political power in Morocco, representing a single 
authoritative figure with the power to work on matters of economy, politics, military, and law, 
with the public support to actually affect change in those areas.57   
ii 
Analysis 
Mohammed VI’s actions in pacifying Morocco were perhaps not in line with traditional 
notions of Machiavellian actions. He shied away from violent confrontation with the protestors, 
as the police were mainly used to keep order rather than break up protestors. The military was 
never called out into the streets, and political imprisonment was restrained. He also willingly 
ceded some of his powers to a newly formed legislative branch, willingly weakening the strength 
of his dynasty and showing weakness by submitting to the demands of the mob. These actions 
have allowed him to become more loved by his subjects, but love is, as made clear by 
Machiavelli, a fickle emotion at best. 
But from a different angle, it is hard not to identify some of Mohammed’s decisions with 
actions in The Prince. Again, it is difficult to realize whether Mohammed had planned to 
scapegoat the legislature for Morocco’s problems in advance. Nevertheless, it is just as difficult 
to argue that he has not taken advantage of the circumstance after it presented itself. This act, 
transferring power to another then using their failures as a means to ingratiate oneself with the 
masses, is quite recognizant of what Cesare Borgia did to Remiro d’Orco in Chapter Seven of 
56 Maghraoui, Abdeslam. "Morocco: The King's Islamists." Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/morocco-the-
king’s-islamists. 
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The Prince. Remiro was tasked with quelling a recently conquered province, and in doing so had 
become a figure of hatred by the people of that area. After he succeeded, Remiro was publically 
executed by Cesare to gain favor with the town Remiro had pacified, thus exhibiting the Borgia’s 
power and brutality to all those who heard of it. Mohammed’s actions were certainly less violent, 
but they were no less cunning. He had dumped the work of governing on his opposition, elevated 
himself to become the people’s defender, and maintained control over the religious establishment 
and military, arguably the two most influential organizations in the Moroccan government. 
Additionally, Mohammed masterfully portrayed his position throughout the Arab Spring. His 
addresses to the public were humble, full of hope, and neglected to take blame for any failing of 
government. News of his “good works”, mingling on street corners with the people and 
promising to work for their betterment, reached far into the Arab world, leading him to be named 
the 5th most influential Muslim leader out of a pool of 500 leaders, comprised from Iran to sub-
Saharan Africa. 58 Instead of being seen as a tyrant, he is lauded for his “domestic reform 
policies and pioneering efforts in modernizing Morocco and countering terrorism. He tackles 
issues of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion at home, and has improved foreign 
relations.”59   
Mohammed VI’s actions were not directly in line with the typical idea of 
Machiavellianism, but they did fit in with the “Machiavellian Regime” established previously. 
Mohammed found himself in charge of a hereditary regime precariously poised at the peak of a 
precipice, one threatening the very existence of his regime. Instead of overreacting and risking 
58 "King Mohammed VI, 5th Most Influential Muslim Leader." Morocco World News RSS. 
October 4, 2014. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/10/140728/king-mohammed-vi-5th-most-influential-
muslim-leader-report/. 
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violation of his dynastic customs, hatred, and the violation of his subject’s private property, 
Mohammed ceded some power to maintain stability. He then worked through powers ceded to 
him as a multi-generational ruler to inspire adoration in his subjects, passing their hatred onto the 
popular government while maintaining control from behind the scenes. He has showed 
significant cunning, political aptitude, and understanding of the value a positive public persona 
affords a leader. His decisions were similarly apt, and while he didn’t rely on repression, they 
certainly aligned with the realpolitik idea of duplicitous diplomacy and the importance of 
propaganda. If Mohammed had relied more on repression, it’s likely that he might’ve met a 
similar fate as other North African leaders did. Therefore, it seems that The Prince would have 
been successful in Morocco, to an extent. To what extent depends on the balance between 
supporting repression and cunning in The Prince, which can be read subjectively to support 
either position.             
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V  
Tunisia 
Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring, and as such managed to draw the attention 
of the entire world based on the intensity of its protests. It’s President, Zine Al Abedine Ben Ali, 
was a democratically elected leader in name only, ruling since the late 1980’s at the head of an 
unequivocally repressive and authoritarian regime.  
While he entered office seen as a reformer and initially began to loosen the repressive 
tendencies of his predecessor, he soon continued a legacy of press censorship and suppression of 
dissent. Ben Ali created a systemic secret police apparatus, formed around the suppression of 
political dissidents and rigging elections.60 His political party, the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally, was the only major party in Tunisian politics and filled almost all positions of 
government. Tunisia was also a relatively prosperous country, enjoying increasing foreign 
investment in the years preceding the revolution.61 It was even labeled as one of the “African 
Tigers,” singled out for its rapidly increasing GDP and political stability when compared with 
the rest of Africa.62 But an unemployment rate of nearly 15% and food availability remained 
points of economic hardship for much of the country, with the worst economic conditions 
focusing on overeducated youths.63 Somehow, this coalition of economic malcontents ousted 
60 Thorne, John. "An Old Spy in the New Tunisia." The Atlantic. July 24, 2012. Accessed May 4, 
2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/an-old-spy-in-the-new-
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61 "Riots Reported in Tunisian City." - Al Jazeera English. December 10, 2010. Accessed May 4, 
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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/201012317536678834.html. 
                                                 
42 
 
President Ben Ali from his position within a month of the beginning of protests. Given the 
position of his regime, and the prosperity of the elite within his country, how did such a stable 
prince lose his hold on power so easily?  
i 
Protests 
The protests in Tunisia mainly began as a response to economic hardship. On December 
17, 2010, a young fruit vendor was assessed a fine by the police in his rural town. Outraged and 
humiliated, he set himself on fire in front of the police station. His story encouraged others 
suffering from economic hardships to protest as well, and the first stories of police crackdowns 
began to emerge on social media around December 20.64 After more suicides of young adults 
protesting unemployment and homelessness, protests finally reached Tunis on the 27th of 
December. At some point during their spread to Tunis, the protests took on a substantially more 
anti-Ben Ali message, in addition to the prior messages of economic hardship. 
The reaction to these protests by police, secret police, and “security forces” was brutal. 
Protestors were beaten by police, shots were fired directly into crowds, and mass arrests began to 
take place.65 A press blackout was implemented to halt images of the crackdown reaching the 
outside world, and access to many popular websites was restricted around the country. On 
January 3rd, 2011, President Ben Ali gave a speech in which he said that the law would be used 
“in all firmness” to punish the protestors.  
On July 9, reports of black-uniformed “security agents” emerged from areas around 
Kessarine. These agents carried military grade weapons, but were not outright affiliated with 
64 "Riots Reported in Tunisian City." - Al Jazeera English.  
65 65 Ryan. "Another Tunisian Protester Dies." 
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either the military or royal guard, and shot at protestors on sight.66 While these stories might 
have been nothing more than fabrications, especially considering the black-clad agents reported 
on were specifically mentioned to include a blonde female, the escalation of violence after the 
President’s January 3rd speech was not. Soon after the speech, security forces stepped up the use 
of both non-lethal teargas and baton assaults on protestors, as well as the use of rubber bullets. 
At some point outright firing into crowds developed, with the use of “dum-dum” bullets 
specifically mentioned, which expand after impact for maximum killing potential.67 While the 
press blackout made confirming casualties and stories difficult, reporting over social media 
enabled news of the crackdown to reach beyond Tunisia.68 International organizations such as 
Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch have since condemned the use of force by 
the Tunisian police and security forces during the protests.6970  
Perhaps sensing that the attempted suppression of the protests was ineffective, President 
Ben Ali returned to television on January 10. In his address, he promised that 300,000 new jobs 
would be created in Tunisia, all universities and schools would be officially closed until further 
notice, and that “masked gangs” and terrorists were responsible for the mass protests sweeping 
66 Ryan, Yasmine. "The Massacre behind the Revolution." - Al Jazeera English. February 16, 
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his nation.71 Far from quelling the protests, Ben Ali’s speech seemed to have an opposite effect, 
drawing reactions from opposition political parties as well as renewed efforts from the protestors. 
Ben Ali would return to television a final time on January 14, in a speech which covered a broad 
base of topics. In it, he pledged not to seek re-election in 2014, cease the use of firearms against 
protestors by security forces, increase subsidies on food, and open the internet for free use.72 
Interestingly, he then went on to say that his advisors had deceived him, that he was a member of 
the Tunisian people at heart. Finally, he called for a state of emergency to be implemented across 
Tunisia, and for elections to be scheduled in six months. Despite these concessions, Ben Ali 
would flee Tunisia later that day, shortly before the military came out to support the protestors.  
ii 
Analysis 
Where did Ben Ali go wrong? He had developed a state centered on his power and 
personality, supported by a massive secret police organization. He had led Tunisia into relative 
prosperity for an African nation, even though the spiraling world-wide depression. He had 
subsidized food, cracked down on outright opposition, and censored the press so information 
hostile to his regime was unable to be spread. While Ben Ali’s government was corrupt, 
sometimes to the point of dispossessing other’s property, it was not excessively tax heavy. All of 
these actions are what one would expect from a typical dictatorial prince, using fear and 
repression along with subsidies to avoid hatred. He even had a secret police and national press to 
71 Randeree, Bilal. "Tunisian Leader Promises New Jobs." - Al Jazeera English. January 10, 
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supply him with positive propaganda. Yet a street protest in a rural town over unemployment 
spiraled to the point where he was unable to continue his reign as president. 
Even his actions once the protests started were defensible using ideas from The Prince. 
The crackdown on protests, escalation from non-lethal dispersion tactics to outright firing into 
crowds, attempting to limit the flow of information from protest zones to other potential 
revolutionaries, Machiavelli likely would have endorsed all of these actions using a simple cost-
benefit analysis of brutality vs. potential damage if protests were to continue. Machiavelli 
certainly wouldn’t have shied away from cruelty or human rights abuses in the face of revolts 
calling for a prince’s resignation. Additionally, Ben Ali was a prince who had proven his ability 
over 50 years of military and government service, heading a mixed principality which had grown 
accustomed to his rule. Once he recognized that repression was unlikely to work, he turned to 
concessions, hoping that the love of the people would keep him in power where fear had failed. 
It was also at that moment that he said something curious about being deceived by his advisors, 
although it’s effectively impossible to know exactly what that was in reference to, Machiavelli 
would likely have questioned how a king ceded so much power to his advisors that they were 
able to deceive him. But by that point, hate had already been fostered in the populace and his 
reign was effectively over.  
By the “Machiavellian regime” standard previously created, Ben Ali acted in a rational 
fashion. He sought to quell his population using both fear and love, coming from an initial 
position of not-hatred, and failed to secure his throne. Reasoning why such a failure occurred 
could be difficult. Looking at it from a strictly “Machiavellian” sense, perhaps Ben Ali had 
simply not gone far enough in his repression of the protestors. If he had been even more brutal, 
reaching levels of violent repression commonly held in infamy, perhaps his people would have 
46 
 
retreated. Another reason for his failure could be the evolution of mass media and social 
networking. As in many other Arab Spring countries, protestors in Tunisia relied heavily on 
proxy servers and the internet for organization. The internet also gave them a route to distribute 
their stories and images to the greater public, drawing scrutiny to the crackdown from both 
people within and without the borders of Tunisia. Or perhaps the poor economic situation in 
Tunisia simply outweighed whatever success Ben Ali might’ve initially had in suppressing the 
protestors. The media and internet could’ve also worked against him in this capacity, as it 
allowed malcontents information on the economic situation outside their country. Whatever the 
exact reason, Ben Ali was deposed, and following a pragmatic “Machiavellian regime” style rule 
failed to secure his power.  
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VI 
Egypt 
Egypt prior to the Arab Spring represented a mixed principality with ambitions of 
moving towards a hereditary monarchy. Hosni Mubarak became president of Egypt after the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat, and ruled for thirty years after gaining the presidency. Some 
referred to him as a modern day pharaoh, ruling Egypt in an authoritarian style regime with full 
intention of passing the presidency onto his son after retirement. But Mubarak’s presidency was 
upended in an incredibly short time, and against an incredibly repressive response from the 
government.  
Mubarak’s reign in Egypt until 2011 had been characterized by stability at the expense of 
freedoms. His regime was extensively supported by western countries, and the military 
establishment from which Mubarak had risen to power was constantly at the forefront of 
Egyptian politics and society. Mubarak also benefitted from martial law as per the “Emergency 
Law” enacted in Egypt as a response to the Six Day War. Originally thought of as a temporary 
measure, the “Emergency Law” was perpetually renewed by the regime. It became a mainstay of 
domestic Egyptian governing, as it gave “greater powers to the police, suspends certain 
constitutional rights in the name of security, allows the state to detain individuals and censor and 
close newspapers more easily and allows authorities to try civilians in front of military and 
security courts under certain circumstances.”73 In 2010, Amnesty International estimated that 
73 Shehata, Samer. "Egypt After 9/11: Perceptions of the United States." Social Science Research 
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somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 people were imprisoned under the “Emergency Law,” all 
in detention without a clear charge or plans for trial.74  
Police brutality also became a staple of the Mubarak regime under the perpetual 
“Emergency Law.” The US State Department released a report in 2009 decrying the human 
rights record of the Egyptian regime, and confirming the commonality of torture against 
detainees by the Egyptian police.75 The torture included horrific acts of physical violence, and 
even went as far as to include domestic journalists accused of anti-regime ideas. There were also 
secret police organizations active under the Mubarak regime, tasked with suppressing protests, 
torturing dissidents, and domestic information gathering. As protests began to emerge, the 
“Emergency Act,” torture and unlawful detentions, and the secret police would all become major 
issues for the protestors.  
Despite the stability of the country, the economic status of Egypt was in flux before the 
emergence of protest. Vast population growth had compressed the amount of available arable 
land, while compressing populations into increasingly crowded cities. As this demographic bulge 
generation has reached the workforce, “unemployment in Egypt is almost 10 times as high for 
college graduates as it is for people who have gone through elementary school.”76 These urban 
poor tended to be young, educated, and unemployed, matching problems similar to other North 
African countries at the outbreak of protests. While Mubarak had achieved some success in 
74 "Egypt: Keep Promise to Free Detainees by End of June: Joint Statement." Amnesty 
International. June 29, 2010. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE12/027/2010/en/. 
75 "2009 Human Rights Report: Egypt." U.S. Department of State. March 11, 2010. Accessed 
May 4, 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm#. 
76 "The Long-term Economic Challenges Egypt Must Overcome." Marketplace: NPR. February 
1, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/new-egypt/long-term-
economic-challenges-egypt-must-overcome. 
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growing Egypt’s tourist industry and GDP, there were simply not enough positions available for 
the educated youth. Food availability also became scarce in the run up to the protests, leading to 
calls for greater subsidies on foodstuffs. Corruption from Mubarak and his advisors also placed 
an increased burden on the economy, with bribery and fraud a common aspect of life.77 
i 
Protests 
The protests in Egypt began as a direct result of those in Tunisia. Seeing the success that 
the opposition protests had in deposing President Ben Ali, oppositional groups in Egypt 
organized a day of protests on January 25, 2011. The protests were organized by a conglomerate 
of oppositional movements, and were focused on protesting the police, lack of term limits on the 
presidency, and head of the Interior Ministry. Again, instrumental in the organizing of the protest 
was online social media, which likely allowed oppositional groups to spread their message to a 
much wider audience than through word of mouth or pamphlets.78 Nevertheless, the police 
stepped in to disperse the protests during the night, firing tear gas into Tahrir Square to 
discourage overnight occupation. Protests continued through January 28, with six protestors 
killed and around 1,000 detained by the police.79  
Then on January 28, also known as the “Friday of Rage,” protestors turned out in great 
numbers across the country. In Cairo specifically, the reprisals against the protests turned more 
77 "Corruption by Country / Territory." Transparency International. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.transparency.org/country#EGY_DataResearch. 
78 Vargas, Jose. "Spring Awakening." The New York Times. February 18, 2012. Accessed May 
4, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began-
on-facebook.html?_r=0. 
79 Maher, Hatem, and Wael Eskandar. "Timeline: Egypt's Year of Revolution - 25 January: 
Revolution Continues – Egypt.” Al Ahram. January 24, 2012. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/114/32352/Egypt/-January-Revolution-
continues/Timeline-Egypts-year-of-revolution.aspx. 
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violent. Hundreds of protestors died and thousands were detained or injured in clashes with 
police. Nevertheless, the protestors managed to arrive at Tahrir Square, prompting a withdrawal 
of police forces and the deployment of army units. That night, Mubarak gave a speech in which 
he dissolved the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, promised “new steps to face 
unemployment and increase the standard of living and services ... new steps to stand by the poor 
and those with limited income,” and expressed regret at the violence which had broken out 
between Egyptian youths and the police.80 Another notable event was the near total 
disconnection of Egypt from the internet that night, an event which was unprecedented since the 
expansion of a global internet.81  
The speech was not as convincing as Mubarak may have hoped. February 1st saw the 
biggest turnout of protestors in Cairo yet, by some estimates comprising a million individuals. 
The protest was focused in Tahrir Square, which was still policed by the Army at that time. 
Seeing that his previous speech was unsuccessful in dispelling the wide public displeasure with 
his rule, Mubarak issued another speech in which he swore off running for another term as 
president, called on the parliament to consider constitutional amendments relating to presidential 
term limits, and spoke at length of his long service to the Egyptian people and devotion to 
reform.82 He also made a point of praising the “noble youth’s…noble and civilized phenomenon 
of practicing freedom of expression,” blaming the violence of the protests on dissident 
80 Saleh, Yasmine, and Dina Zayed. "Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's Speech." Reuters. 
January 29, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/29/us-egypt-
mubarak-speech-idUSTRE70S0SA20110129. 
81 "Egypt Leaves the Internet." Dyn Research. January 27, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://research.dyn.com/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet/. 
82 Mubarak, Hosni. "Hosni Mubarak's Speech: Full Text." The Guardian. February 1, 2011. 
Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/02/president-hosni-
mubarak-egypt-speech. 
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individuals seeking to destabilize Egypt for their political gain. 83This was perhaps a thinly 
veiled reference towards the Muslim Brotherhood, who had long been outlawed by Mubarak 
over their involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.  
The public reaction to this speech was not much better than the one given on January 28. 
Instead of dispersing, protestors continued to rally in Tahrir Square, calling for Mubarak’s 
resignation as president. A group of pro-Mubarak supporters mounted on camels and horses then 
charged into the protestors on the square in an attempt on clearing the crowds.84 While it is 
difficult to correlate such action with a direct government order, given that many government 
officials accused of organizing the event were later found innocent, it’s worth noting that neither 
the police nor army who were standing guard around the square intervened. Protests continued in 
similar fashion, with rallies in the square and daily marches met by police and regime-supporter 
violence, until February 10th, when Mubarak ventured to make yet another speech. This speech 
was unique as many protestors and opposition members thought that Mubarak may officially 
announce his resignation, instead he went forward with more promises. He reiterated that he 
would not seek election again, and that the Presidency would be awarded to whomever the 
people choose in a September election, that six amendments to the constitution had been sent to 
the parliament including a repeal of the emergency act, and that he would delegate significant 
powers to his vice president, something which Mubarak had steadfastly avoided throughout his 
reign. 85 Again, instead of quelling protests, Mubarak’s speech incited anger in the protestors 
83 Mubarak. "Hosni Mubarak's Speech: Full Text."  
84 "Egypt Acquits 'Camel Battle' Defendants." - Al Jazeera English. October 10, 2012. Accessed 
May 4, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/10/2012101018616938632.html. 
85 Mubarak, Hosni. "Hosni Mubarak's Speech to the Egyptian People." Washington Post. 
February 10, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021005290_3.html?sid=ST2011020703989. 
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who were expecting his removal.86 The next day, dubbed “Defiance Friday,” saw thousands of 
protestors march on the Presidential Palace and state television building demanding Mubarak’s 
resignation.87 It was at this point that Mubarak finally relinquished his office, thus ending his 
reign in Egypt.  
ii 
Analysis 
Much like President Ben Ali in Tunisia, President Mubarak was a conservative leader 
who valued stability over his citizens’ rights. He had led Egypt through difficult international 
times, avoiding conflicts with Israel and had suppressed the burgeoning Islamist political 
movement for many years. But he was unsuccessful in ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to 
maintain power.  
Much of what Mubarak did to quell the Arab Spring in Egypt was well within the 
boundaries of the “Machiavellian regime”. He had developed a sophisticated authoritarian 
regime where his power was unquestionably absolute. He used state censorship and control over 
media to promote his agenda and to silence his enemies, including the protestors during the early 
stages of the revolt. He had control over the military and police establishment, with a dedicated 
force of secret police clearly willing to torture and violate the rights of their fellow citizens on 
his behalf. He used all of these advantages against the protestors, and furthermore showed few 
qualms about resorting to brutality as a means of quelling the uprising. While he didn’t outright 
86 "Protesters Outraged over Mubarak Address, Vow to Continue Revolution - Egypt - Ahram 
Online." Al Ahram. February 11, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/5388/Egypt/Protesters-outraged-over-Mubarak-
address,-vow-to-c.aspx. 
87 Maher, Hatem, and Wael Eskandar. "Timeline: Egypt's Year of Revolution - 25 January: 
Revolution Continues – Egypt.” 
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slaughter the people in the streets, hundreds died and many thousands more were detained or 
injured, certainly enough to satisfy Machiavelli’s pronouncement that cruelty in the face of an 
uprising is a justified and wise action. He also clearly relied on a culture of fear to keep peace in 
Egypt, but was pragmatic enough to try love when it became clear that fear no longer worked to 
keep his people in line. The duplicitous nature was there, although it may be safe to say that 
Mubarak was not an especially learned or cunning man, just one skilled at repression. 
Nevertheless, Mubarak was clearly a ruler of some aptitude, and understood propaganda well 
enough over the course of thirty years to warrant the loyalty of those he commanded.  
So why did the “Machiavellian Regime” fail in Egypt? Like Tunisia, defining a clear 
reason for the failure of authoritarianism is difficult. Certainly the trying economic times played 
a part, as unemployment in a large youth population is a classic recipe for anti-government 
insurgency. Perhaps Mubarak’s corruption and lack of economic reforms finally fomented hate 
from the population when food became scarce and jobs scarcer. The internet also played a 
substantial part in Mubarak’s failure. Social networking was heavily involved in organizing the 
protests from the very beginning, and gave the protestors a “place for venting the outrage 
resulting from years of repression, economic instability and individual frustration,” likely leading 
to radicalization against the regime.88 Even when the regime went as far as to disconnect Egypt 
from the internet, somehow reports and pictures from Tahrir Square still made it out to the 
general population. Because they were no longer able to control the message, and Mubarak’s 
already disliked regime became seen as a totally repressive force, any propaganda the 
government produced was simply written off as false and hate for the regime further mounted.  
88 Vargas, Jose. "Spring Awakening."  
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An interesting connotation to this phenomena involves Mubarak’s several speeches 
during the revolution, as he tried to backpedal from his initially repressive stance towards the 
protestors. Instead of becoming satisfied with promises of reform and smaller concessions, the 
demand for Mubarak’s resignation simply became more prevalent. Whether such a scenario 
would have occurred without the availability of social networking and global media is 
questionable.     
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VII 
Syria 
The authoritarian regime in Syria was based around the hereditary rule of the Al-Assad 
family. Hafez Al-Assad ruled as a virtual dictator until July of 2000, when his son Bashar took 
over the Presidency. Bashar had been educated extensively in the United Kingdom, and initially 
hopes of his platform as a reformist President were high. Instead, Bashar quickly cracked down 
on any outspoken, pro-reform Syrian intellectuals and continued in his father’s tradition of 
political repression. This same theme of hope for reform, followed by brutal oppression, 
manifested itself again during the rise of the Arab Spring. More than any other nation so far 
discussed, Syria was, and continues to be, the most violent byproduct of the Arab Spring 
protests. Bashar spared no thought for international perception of his actions, at some point 
giving up hope of a negotiated settlement in favor of pure brutality. Still, his regime was unable 
to effectively put down the Arab Spring protests. 
Politically, the Bashar Al-Assad government closely followed in the footsteps of his 
father’s regime. The Syrian state under Bashar was a single party state, where the ruling Ba’ath 
party was enshrined in the Syrian constitution as the “leader of the state and society.”89 Similar 
to Egypt, the Al-Assad regime had continually used and upheld an emergency measure enacted 
during the 1960’s well into the beginning of protests. The emergency measure banned public 
gatherings of more than five individuals, effectively throttling public dissent until the Arab 
Spring.90 Bashar also had a substantial secret police apparatus in the “Al Jawiya,” a group which 
89 Oweis, Khaled. "Syria's Assad Vows to Lift Emergency Law by next Week." Reuters. April 
16, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/16/us-syria-
idUSTRE72N2MC20110416. 
90 Ibid. 
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also played a part in the regime’s substantial propaganda output.91 Human rights were also 
subject to violation by the Al-Assad regime, denying citizens their freedom of expression and 
torturing dissidents. While Bashar did not reach the same levels of butchery that his father did 
prior to the outbreak of Civil War, as Hafez reportedly killed 10-20,000 civilians in the 
suppression of riots, the political and human rights abuses were significant in the beginnings of 
protests.    
 As in many of the previously discussed countries, demographics and economics played a 
significant factor in beginning the Syrian Arab Spring protests. Firstly, the ruling Alawite sect is 
Shia, while the majority of the country is Sunni. This inevitably created some tension and 
resentment among the Sunni population over preferential treatment Shia were receiving in the 
government. This religious tension helped feed into a second point, rising socio-economic 
difficulties. Majority Sunni cities such as Daraa and Homs were some of the poorest and worst 
employed cities in Syria leading up to 2011, and were consequently integral locations for the 
spread of protests.92 Many of the rural Sunni areas in Syria had also been subjected to a four year 
long drought, destroying previously arable lands.93 This was partially a consequence of Bashar 
and Hafez Al-Assad’s modernization plans for the Syrian economy, which in actuality 
91 Watson, Ivan, Raja Razek, and Saad Abedine. "Defecting Syrian Propagandist Says His Job 
Was 'to Fabricate'" CNN. October 9, 2012. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/world/meast/syria-propagandist-defects/. 
92 Fahim, Kareem, and Hwaida Saad. "A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria’s 
War." The New York Times. February 8, 2013. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-faceless-teenage-refugee-who-helped-
ignite-syrias-war.html?_r=0. 
93 Saleby, Suzanne. "Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social 
Contract's Unraveling." Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian 
Social Contract's Unraveling. February 16, 2012. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-the-seeds-of-dissent_economic-grievances-
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concentrated wealth at the hands of Baath party members at the expense of the lower classes.94 
And as always, there was significant unemployment specifically in the educated youth 
demographic in the decade prior to 2011. Internet and social media access was also restricted in 
Syria, especially after the integral part they both played in other revolutions. Between systemic 
youth unemployment, an oncoming agricultural and water crisis, and religious tensions, the 
previously stable Syrian state was primed for confrontation.  
i 
Protests 
The actual civil uprising in Syria began on March 15, mainly in Damascus, Aleppo, and 
Daraa. As previously mentioned, these cities all had significant unemployment, especially among 
youths, and had large numbers of disenfranchised Sunni citizens. They began in response to the 
arrest of several adolescents who spray painted pro-Arab Spring slogans onto a wall. The 
protests were highly political, demanding more freedoms and democratic government.95 Police 
spared little time, and quickly turned to teargas and live rounds to clear the mobs. Instead of 
curtailing the revolts, the crowds grew larger in many cities. Facebook groups supporting the 
new “Syrian Revolution” began to appear, calling for renewed protests in the face of police 
brutality.96 By March 25, Al-Assad attempted to give concessions to the protestors, offering a 
repeal of the emergency act and the discussion of more political freedoms in return for de-
escalation of the protests. He also had released a statement saying that he specifically ordered the 
94 Ibid. 
95 Sinjab, Lina. "Middle East Unrest: Silence Broken in Syria - BBC News." BBC News. March 
11, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12794882. 
96 "In Syria, Crackdown After Protests." The New York Times. March 18, 2011. Accessed May 
4, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html. 
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police not to shoot into masses of protestors, but the very next day they did just that.97 But the 
propaganda machine in Syria continued to remain strong, as foreign reporters were banned from 
Syria and television news stations only reported on pro-Bashar crowds.98 This pattern of police 
repression through beatings and live ammunition coupled with assurances of statewide peace by 
state news networks continued well into April.  
On March 30, Bashar gave a televised speech on the Syrian government network. Instead 
of offering further concessions to protestors, as other leaders did, Bashar instead played up the 
strength of his regime and his resolve to overcome the saboteurs who want “to fragment Syria, to 
bring down Syria as a nation, to enforce an Israeli agenda.”99 This effectively heralded in a new 
phase of the Syrian regime response to the protests, with a greater reliance on military action. On 
April 25, Daraa, one of the beginning cities of the protests, was occupied by tanks supported 
with infantry. Reports of shootouts in the streets quickly spread, as the Syrian Army sought out 
protest leaders.100 The city was effectively put into siege, as the army shut off utilities, water, and 
internet from the beleaguered townspeople. Even reports of shallow mass graves uncovered by 
townspeople began emanation out of the occupied Daraa zone.101 And by May 5, Daraa had been 
97 Slackman, Michael. "Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities." The New York 
Times. March 25, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Slackman, Michael. "Syrian Leader Blames ‘Conspiracy’ for Turmoil." The New York Times. 
March 30, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/middleeast/31syria.html?gwh=EAC678C9C6D7270
7A8A51C4D79F76B16&gwt=pay&_r=0. 
100 Shadid, Anthony. "Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City." The New York 
Times. April 25, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html. 
101Abdelaziz, Salma. "Shallow Grave Yields Several Bodies in Syrian City Marked by Unrest." 
CNN. May 16, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
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quelled, and the military moved to occupy Homs and towns across the Syrian countryside in a 
similar manner. By May 24, an Egyptian human rights organization said that they could account 
for over 1,000 civilians killed by the Syrian army, with more than 10,000 more detained during 
the protests.102 It was at this point that the first mentions of armed resistance fighters emerged 
from the growing Syrian warzone. Since then Syria has been mired in civil war, with atrocities 
committed by all sides in the conflict, and foreign fighters playing a key role in maintaining 
manpower for the religious proxy war.  
i 
Analysis 
Did Bashar Al-Assad’s government follow the “Machiavellian regime”? If nothing else, 
he certainly followed Machiavelli’s prescriptions for a hereditary monarchy, following directly 
in his father’s footsteps in terms of repression and denial of basic human rights. He also clearly 
meant to inspire fear with his continual repression of protestors. A duplicitous nature also 
emerged from his various offers of vague concessions and reforms, showing a willingness to use 
cunning where direct force had not managed to secure a desirable result. Bashar even had a well-
established propaganda arm to his regime, and had managed to achieve an almost complete ban 
on foreign reporters from his territory until the civil war truly began. Media and internet access 
was supposedly similarly controlled, although reports on regime brutality and protest 
organizations managed to find their way around Syria thanks to proxy sites.  
But Machiavelli never endorsed cruelty beyond what was barely necessary for the 
fulfillment of a goal. In The Prince, cruelty and regime brutality were depicted as loathsome acts 
102 "Syria Death Toll 'surpasses 1,000'" - Al Jazeera English. May 24, 2011. Accessed May 4, 
2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/2011524182251952727.html. 
                                                 
60 
 
meant to be limited if at all possible. Similarly, avoiding hatred from interfering with citizens 
loved ones and personal property was a key tenant of The Prince’s core policy. By ordering his 
military to essentially lay siege to his own people and directing police to shoot into crowds 
during the very beginning of the protests, Bashar galvanized the hatred against him. What was a 
previously stable “Machiavellian regime” faced with economic issues and some democratic 
fervor quickly became a people united against a government which sought to kill them and their 
loved ones. Do such actions still fit in with the notion that the Al-Assad regime was a follower of 
a “Machiavellian regime” style policy? While not in as much as other regimes previously 
discussed, but it would be somewhat hypocritical to say that the type of decisive authoritarian 
repression pursued by Bashar wasn’t rooted at least partially in Machiavelli’s teachings.  
So why did an arguably “Machiavellian regime” fail in this case? Hatred seems to be the 
clearest answer. The uninhibited brutality exhibited by Bashar Al-Assad in trying to crush the 
protests simply made his people more willing to fight. The Prince says that cruelty in moderation 
can actually be better for a society in that it creates a utilitarian outcome, but in Syria the amount 
of violence may have been more than what Machiavelli would’ve held as moderate. There’s also 
a legitimate question of whether Syria would’ve experienced such an expansion of the revolution 
if the regime had managed to segregate Daraa and other starting locations from the rest of the 
state. Again, technology and media must have played a part in inciting more unrest.  
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VIII 
Conclusion 
From the analysis conducted on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, it’s clear that The 
Prince can no longer be taken as a literal policy treatise. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria where the 
authoritarian regimes in power closely adhered to the tactics of the “Machiavellian regime,” 
frugality, fear over love over hatred, repression, propaganda, duplicitous negotiations, and 
cunning, the regimes failed. It did not matter how repressive the regime was, how the regime 
justified their decisions to the people, or how quickly the regime offered concessions to the 
protestors, the authoritarian realpolitik model of state government was unable to maintain clear 
dominance. Morocco was a different beast, as it had a distinctly different political structure and 
past history than the other three regimes. And where fear and repression failed elsewhere, 
Morocco’s tactics of conciliation worked perfectly. The protests were quelled, the people shifted 
their anger towards another political figure, and Mohammed VI has been able to continue 
significantly influencing events in his country from his position of religious and economic 
power.  
Then again, was The Prince truly ever supposed to be used in this manner? While it had a 
significant amount of time and space devoted to suggesting the best policies and personalities for 
a prince, it never outright gave specific methods which must be taken to achieve success in an 
endeavor. Machiavelli’s questionable relationship with despotic regimes and the potential satire 
contained within The Prince raise even more questions about the actual applicability of the 
prince to politics. 
Nevertheless, The Prince does give a good indication of what would’ve been considered 
good realist politics during the Renaissance. And from that comes another question, would 
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Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have been successful in their repression of protests in Machiavelli’s 
time? It would seem likely. If these regimes had been able to quarantine news of unrest just to 
towns where it began, then quick brutality would likely have been enough to smash the protests 
and continue ruling as if it had never occurred. And even if news did somehow spread, there 
would’ve been no way for protestors to organize across the city without significant skullduggery, 
and there certainly wouldn’t have been any way to coordinate protests across a country. The 
rebels could have been crushed in their towns, and nobody in other cities or outside the country 
would’ve known anything about it. In fact, this style of authoritarian regime has been seen for 
generations since Machiavelli, and was especially used by Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar’s father as 
late as the 1970’s and 80’s. 
 So what changed? In this case, certainly not the people or economy, as rural North 
Africa and Syria is perhaps as close to Medieval as it gets nowadays.  
It was technology. Technology in the form of social media, online forums, online news, 
uploading photos, the 24 hour media cycle, satellite phones, mobile internet, satellite television, 
proxy websites, and telephone communications. All of these technologies played some part in 
ruining the authoritarian response to the Arab Spring. Because of social media, protestors were 
able to organize protests and avoid police blockades. Because of online forums, unemployed 
youths and malcontents could whip themselves into hatred of the government by bouncing 
stories off of one another. And because of the online news media, stories of repression and 
brutality made it out to the wider population within minutes of their occurrence.  
The Prince was not primarily about how a prince should think, it was about how he 
should conduct himself through public relations to avoid being hated. When propaganda can be 
refuted by outside sources available to all, and when stories of a princes injustices becomes viral, 
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there is no way to hide from hatred, no amount of fear or love can overwhelm such widespread 
knowledge. Thus, the end of the “end justifying the means” has come, and the internet has 
brought it about.   
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